The Bottom Line

March 16, 2010

When we have discussed health care reform, in the passed, we have charted and graphed the effects of the bills on direct spending (general mandatory spending) and on revenues. But the bills also authorize a considerable amount of discretionary spending, which future Congresses can spend through the appropriations process. Although CBO has still not accounting for all of this authority, they have begun to measure it here.

According to CBO, there are three types of discretionary costs:

  • Implicit authorization of discretionary costs associated with implementing the new policies established under the legislation; although no provisions in the legislation specifically authorize such spending, it would be necessary for agencies to carry out the responsibilities that would be required of them by the bill.
  • Explicit authorizations for a variety of grant and other programs for which specified funding levels for possible future appropriations are set in the act for one or more years. (Such cases include provisions where a specified funding level is authorized for an initial year along with the authorization of such sums as may be necessary for continued funding in subsequent years.)
  • Explicit authorizations for a variety of grant and other programs for which no funding levels are specified in the legislation.

CBO estimates $5 to $10 billion (over ten years) in implicit authorization for the IRS to implement the bill, and at least another $5 to $10 billion for the Department of Health and Human Services for the same purpose.

In addition, the CBO estimates that the bill authorizes at least $56 billion in explicit funds. This includes $34 billion for grants to Federal Qualified Health Centers between 2010 and 2015 (presumable more would be authorized at that point). But it excludes all the grants and programs which are funded with "such sums as may be necessary" rather than a specific number.

Here is their chart (excluding the implicit IRS and HHS funds):

March 16, 2010

In the March/April edition of Foreign Affairs, Niall Ferguson offers an interesting piece on the fall of empires – arguing that most collapses of world powers have been associated with fiscal crises and have come abruptly (an indication that a slow decline is not what citizens and policymakers should be worrying about).

Examining the historical experiences of ancient Rome, the Ming Dynasty in China, the British Empire, and the Soviet Union, declines have come precipitously and unexpectedly. Ferguson cites the United States’ dire fiscal outlook, with public debt expected to more than double from $5.8 trillion in 2008 to $14.3 trillion in 2019 under the CBO’s baseline projections, and argues that:

“In imperial crises, it is not the material underpinnings of power that really matter but expectations about future power. The fiscal numbers citied above cannot erode U.S. strength on their own, but they can work to weaken a long-assumed faith in the United States’ ability to weather any crisis.”

We have already begun seeing this happen, as credit rating agencies have been warning about the unsustainable course of U.S. debt and interest payments (see yesterday’s post on Moody’s quarterly report here).

At this point, Ferguson warns about a “seemingly random piece of bad news” one day about U.S. debt that will generate widespread concern not only among policymakers and analysts but in the public at large and investors abroad. Ferguson believes this change – people losing faith in the United States’ viability – to be the crucial one.

It’s not only the strength of our economy and standard of living that are at risk in a fiscal crisis, it’s also our role in the world.

March 16, 2010

There has been a lot of talk about revenue levels under Paul Ryan's "Roadmap for America's Future" recently. Not only from us (here, here, and here) and Congressman Ryan, but also from the Tax Policy Center (here, here, and here), the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (here and here), the Heritage Foundation, E21, the New Republic's John Chait, and others.

Although many observers (including TPC and CBPP) contend that Ryan's Roadmap would not raise the amount of revenue he has claimed, the intentions of Ryan's plan are clear -- to bring the debt under control without increasing taxes relative to current policy (or beyond 19 percent of GDP for that matter).

Based on these revenue targets, Ryan's plan would balance the budget around 2060, and eliminate the debt by 2080. But it accomplishes this goal only through dramatic spending cuts -- and, problematically, only after first letting debt held by the public hit upwards of 100 percent of GDP. Although a tremendous improvement from current policy (and even current law), this level of debt is dangerous, and would leave us little fiscal flexibility over the next several decades.

As we've said before, it may be too late to control the debt through spending cuts alone.

But what if Representative Ryan were a little less strict about his revenue limits? According to our calculations, small increases in revenue, combined with the Congressman's spending plans, can make a big difference.

If we enacted the Roadmap spending plan, but let revenues remain as under current law (including letting all the Bush tax cuts expire and ceasing to patch the AMT), debt would begin to fall in only a couple of years. By 2025, it would decline to 50 percent of GDP, by 2040 it would drop to 30 percent, and by 2050 it would be gone altogether.

Of course, under current law taxes will increase significantly -- to 26 percent of GDP by 2080. But what if we instead capped taxes at 20 percent of GDP? Above the historically average, but below the record levels under President Clinton. In that case, debt would hold steady around 60 percent of GDP through 2040, drop to 40 percent after 2050, and disappear soon after 2060.

 

 

Even under the tax plan in President Obama's budget, which renews most of the Bush Tax Cuts and continues to patch the AMT, debt would peak at 70 percent of GDP and be eliminated by 2065.

The bottom line is that, if accompanied by Congressman Ryan's ambitious spending plan, a little bit of revenue can make a big difference in terms stabilizing the debt. This is especially true if Members of Congress find themselves unwilling to cut spending by the levels Mr. Ryan has proposed.

That said, it is quite clear that revenues cannot be all or even most of the long-term solution. The Tax Policy Center has already shown the massive (and perhaps untenable) income tax increases which would be necessary just to get us through the next decade. But what if we didn't rely on rate increases alone? What if we reduced tax expenditures, implemented an energy tax, etc?

Well we did a little thought experiment. Congressman Ryan showed the spending levels necessary to eliminate the debt (by 2080) under current policy revenue levels (capped at 19 percent of GDP). So we tried construct a "reverse roadmap" which raised the necessary revenue levels to meet Congressman Ryan's annual debt targets, assuming current policy spending.

Our findings are unfortunate for those who think we can maintain our current spending path. To simply keep up with Ryan's Roadmap -- which still means letting debt rise to 100 percent of GDP -- revenues would have to rise from a historical average of 18.1 percent of GDP, to 22 percent in the early 2020s, 24 percent by 2030, 30 percent by 2050, and 40 percent by 2080. In other words, would have to more than double as a share of the economy.

That's certainly a roadmap to somewhere -- but probably not a place this country should or can go.

March 15, 2010

Health Care Reform Moves Toward Showdown – The House Budget Committee today voted to push health care legislation forward. It now moves to the House Rules Committee, which later this week will make changes and approve of a rule for its consideration on the House floor. The bill approved by the Budget Committee today was merely a placeholder, the Rules Committee will make changes endorsed by the Democratic leadership designed to “correct” the health care overhaul approved by the Senate late last year in order to attract more votes in the House.

Arcane Rules Provide Easter Eggs for Democrats – The Rules Committee is contemplating designing a complex rule that will allow the Senate bill to be “deemed” approved when the House either approves of the rule or the corrections bill, thus shielding members from directly voting on the Senate bill many of them find unacceptable without the legislative fix. This is similar to the rule that allowed the House to approve of the debt limit increase in January without directly voting on it. House leaders are aiming to have a final vote by the weekend to send it to the Senate. The Senate will then consider the corrections bill via the budget reconciliation process, which will allow it to be approved by a simple majority vote, avoiding a Republican filibuster. If all goes according to Democrats’ plans, the President will sign health care reform before Congress recesses for Easter. However, the votes are projected to be close. Many Democrats are still awaiting analysis of the budgetary effects of the legislation from the CBO before they decide how they will vote. Last week CRFB called for cost-containment to be the centerpiece for health care reform.

Resolve Slips on Budget Resolution – The health care debate likely means that work on the budget resolution will be put off until after the Easter break. Leaders in both chambers had earlier discussed the possibility of marking up a resolution before Easter, but health care is expected to delay that timetable. It is doubtful a resolution will be approved by the April 15 deadline.

Jobs Agenda Part One Set for Passage – The Senate is expected to approve of HR 2847, the HIRE Act, by tomorrow. Cloture was invoked this afternoon. The bill, considered the first part of Democrats’ “Jobs Agenda,” includes tax credits to employers who hire unemployed workers and reauthorizes highway and transit funding for the year. It also extends and expands the Build America bonds program. This version includes offsets for the entire $17.6 billion cost that the Blue Dogs demanded in the House.

Part Two Bids Much Higher Than HIRE – The Senate approved part two of the jobs agenda last week, a package that extends unemployment compensation and COBRA benefits for the unemployed, along with many tax breaks, until the end of the year at a cost of approximately $140 billion. Much of the cost is not offset, with many provisions deemed “emergency” spending that is not subject to PAYGO. CRFB called for longer term offsets as a means to make the bill more effective. An amendment from Senator Tom Coburn was unanimously approved that requires the Senate to post information concerning spending that is not paid for on its website. It is not clear when the House will act on this measure.

Sky’s the Limit for FAA Reauthorization – The Senate this week is expected to resume consideration of the reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration. The popular bill has attracted numerous amendments, including one from Senator Russell Feingold to rescind unused transportation earmarks, an earmark moratorium, and another attempt by Senators Claire McCaskill (D-MO) and Jeff Sessions (R-AL) to cap discretionary spending.

An Earful on Earmarks – Reigning in earmarks has become a popular topic in Congress. Democratic leaders of the House Appropriations Committee last week announced they would not approve earmarks for for-profit entities. The House Republican Conference followed quickly with a one-year ban on earmarks. The Senate is not so keen to follow the lead of the House.

March 15, 2010

On Monday, Moody’s Investor Service released its quarterly report (courtesy of Zero Hedge) on government debt held by large countries with the highest bond rating (the Aaa rating): France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States (with notes on Spain and the Scandinavian countries). Moody’s and the other bond rating agencies have warned for months that the bond rating of a country could drop if governments do not begin to pay more attention to their burgeoning debt. While Moody’s notes that there is “no imminent rating pressure for Aaa Governments,” the risk of a downgrade continues to climb. Moody’s argues that:

  • Growth alone will not resolve an increasingly complicated debt equation. Preserving debt affordability at levels consistent with Aaa ratings will invariably require fiscal adjustments of a magnitude that, in some cases, will test social cohesion.
  • Tightening fiscal policy before private demand has become self-sustaining would involve the risk of putting growth on an even lower trajectory, thereby damaging a government’s main asset: its power to tax.
  • Postponing fiscal consolidation much longer is no less risky as it would test the patience of the market – and of central banks. Although Aaa governments benefit from an unusual degree of balance sheet flexibility, that flexibility is not infinite. At the current elevated debt levels, a rise in the government’s cost of funding can very quickly render debt much less affordable – and potentially exert more abrupt pressure on the ratings.

Rather than looking at the debt-to-GDP ratio as the primary factor for assessing the potential for a government to lose its Aaa rating, Moody’s suggests another measurement: the ratio of annual interest payments required to maintain a government’s debt to its annual tax revenues. Moody’s argues that “debt affordability” is a better measure because how much flexibility a government has for other spending is determined by its past debt accumulation.

Moody’s emphasizes that there is no specific marker (although 10 percent is a marker that could be a warning sign) that would generate a downgrade of a country’s rating, rather the rating is subject to the debt affordability measure and the debt reversibility measure (a government’s ability to reverse the debt trend). In fact, Moody’s emphasizes this point, the rating "hinges on the credibility of the long-term fiscal adjustment plans” of a government and a country’s willingness to undertake fiscal consolidation.

We would only do so if we came to the conclusion that either the government was unable to restore affordability to a level consistent with an Aaa rating (the circumstances that led to Ireland’s downgrade in July 2009) or that the government chose to live with a permanently higher debt burden. Debt reversibility therefore provides a measure of the extent to which we would give a government the benefit of the doubt, if its finances were stretched but we believed its determination to correct the situation was unequivocal.

So, how does Moody’s assess the likelihood of a downgrade in the U.S. rating? According to Moody’s assessment of the debt projections in the Administration’s FY 2011 budget, the debt affordability measure would rise to nearly 18 percent by 2020 (roughly the rate from the 1980s, although Moody’s notes that the ratio then was due to high interest rates, rather than the size of the debt). If that measure actually reached those levels, Moody’s estimates that “there would be at some point be downward pressure on the Aaa of the federal government.” And while Moody’s notes the establishment of a fiscal commission, it argues that “the politics of actually implementing such reforms remain uncertain.”

March 15, 2010

On Friday evening, the FDIC reported that it has taken over an additional four banks (Statewide Bank, Old Southern Bank, The Park Avenue Bank, LibertyPointe Bank) for a cost to the FDIC of about $200 million. This brings the total number of failed banks since the beginning of 2008 to 196.

Total deposits of all failed banks now equal $14.8 billion for 2010 and $386 billion since the beginning of 2008, all at an estimated cost to the FDIC of $63 billion. Visit Stimulus.org for more details and a full list of FDIC bank closings.
 

 

 Total DepositsCost to the FDIC
Statewide Bank$208,800,000$38,100,000
Old Southern Bank$319,700,000$94,600,000
The Park Avenue Bank$494,500,000$50,700,000
LibertyPointe Bank$209,500,000$24,800,000
Total$1,232,500,000$208,200,000

 

March 12, 2010

Congressional GOP leaders have just named three Senators and three Congressman to sit on the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, established by the President in mid-February to reduce the deficit to a sustainable level by 2015 (see CRFB's previous discussion of the Commission here).

Senate Republicans chose Senator Judd Gregg (NH), Senator Mike Crapo (ID), and Senator Tom Coburn (OK), while House Republicans chose Congressman Paul Ryan (WI), Congressman Dave Camp (MI), and Congressman Jeb Hensarling (TX). House Democrats have yet to name their appointments to the Commission.

Named members now include:

  • Eskine Bowles (Democratic Co-Chair)
  • Alan Simpsons (Republican Co-Chair)
  • Alice Rivlin (Presidential Appointee - Democrat)
  • David Cote (Presidential Appointee - Republican)
  • Andy Stern (Presidential Appointee - Democrat)
  • Ann Fudge (Presidential Appointee - Democrat)
  • Kent Conrad (Senate Democrat)
  • Max Baucus (Senate Democrat)
  • Dick Durbin (Senate Democrat)
  • Judd Gregg (Senate Republican)
  • Mike Crapo (Senate Republican)
  • Tom Coburn (Senate Republican)
  • Paul Ryan (House Republican)
  • Dave Camp (House Republican)
  • Jeb Hensarling (House Republican)

 

See our previous commentary on the Commission:

Press Release – Joint Statement on the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform

Obama Appoints Four More to the Deficit Commission

Democrats Named to Deficit Panel

CRFB, Concord, and CED Commend Commission

Obama Establishes Deficit Commission

Erskine Bowles and Alan Simpson to Lead Deficit Commission

March 11, 2010

Today a new bipartisan caucus was announced to support passage of H.J. Res.1, a balanced budget constitutional amendment. The co-chairs are Representatives Mike Coffman (R-CO) and Jim Marshall (D-GA) and founding members are Representatives Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) and Mike McIntyre (D-NC).

H.J. Res. 1 directs the President to submit a balanced budget to Congress annually. It also prohibits annual outlays (except for repayment of debt principal) from exceeding receipts (except those derived from borrowing); a three-fifths vote of each chamber would be required to waive the requirement for a specific expenditure. A three-fifths vote would also be required to increase the public debt limit. Any bill increasing revenue would require a majority roll call vote in each chamber for approval. Waivers would be allowed in times of war or other circumstances involving military conflict. The bill currently has 175 co-sponsors in the House.

If ratified, the amendment would take effect the later of the second fiscal year beginning after its ratification or fiscal year 2016. The preliminary CBO analysis of the President’s FY 2011 budget estimates an $894 billion deficit that year, which is the gap that would have to be erased in order to balance the budget. That would force the kind of difficult decisions that Washington has been unwilling to make.

At a press conference launching the caucus its leaders stressed the need to address rising budget deficits in a bipartisan manner. Goodlatte stated that the “public is focused on this issue above all others” and that it is the top issue expressed by his constituents. The members displayed a chart with recent figures from the CBO on the rising debt-to-GDP ratio in the President’s FY 2011 budget to make their case for addressing the debt.

Coffman said that the amendment would “force us to make the tough decisions” regarding budget priorities, such debate over priorities is currently lacking in Congress according to the Congressman. Marshall used the example of the current health care bill, arguing that if lawmakers were compelled to focus on the cost issue in health care, they would be more motivated to find solutions.

There was also much talk of how running up debt will adversely affect future generations. Goodlatte said that inaction on tackling the debt is “kicking the can down the road – kicking it towards our grandchildren.” Marshall added that this generation has a moral obligation to future generations to act.

All expressed optimism that the significant hurdles to enacting a constitutional amendment could be overcome. They noted that similar amendments received the required 2/3 majority in the House in 1995 and 1997 while falling just one vote short of that threshold both times in the Senate. Marshall expressed optimism that the required 3/4 of states would ratify it “within a year.” All but one state has a balanced budget requirement for state budgets.

The Blue Dog coalition also recently unveiled a balanced budget amendment. CRFB welcomes the focus on the need for budget discipline and addressing mounting deficits and debt. These proposals move the debate towards getting specific about stabilizing the debt and developing a credible fiscal plan, which needs to happen now. As Coffman said today, we risk a financial meltdown if we don’t act.

March 11, 2010

CRFB has updated its comparisons of the costs of the President's proposed policies -- outlined in the President's FY 2011 Budget -- incorporating new revenue estimates from JCT (see our original post on the CBO's preliminary analysis of the President's Budget here).

The CBO now estimates that the President's budget proposals would create $9.8 trillion in deficits over the coming decade, compared to OMB's estimate of $8.5 trillion. CRFB will update this table again when the CBO releases its complete analysis of the President's Budget.

 

 

OMB and CBO Estimates of 2011-2020 Costs of Provisions in President's FY 2011 Budget (billions)#
  OMB CBO
BEA Baseline Deficit
$5,472 $5,984
     
Tax Proposals    
Renew 2001/2003 Tax Cuts for Families Making under $250,000 $2,419 $2,465
Index AMT to Inflation $659 $577
Limit Itemized Deductions -$291 -$289
Reform U.S. International Tax System -$122 -$122
Impose Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee -$90 -$90
Tax Cuts for Families and Individuals $143 $154
Tax Cuts for Businesses $93 $82
Continue Certain Expiring Provisions $47 $63
Close Tax Gap -$49 -$22
Loophole Closers and Other Revenue Raisers -$207 -$226
Other* $9 $19
 Subtotal $2,617 $2,617
     
Spending Proposals    
Stimulus* $169 $131
Health Care Placeholder* -$150 -$150
Modify Pell Grants~ $187 $197
Medicare Physician Payment Update $371 $286
Student Loan Reform -$49 -$67
Waste, Fraud, and Abuse -$132 N/A@
Discretionary Changes (including placeholder for reduced war spending)^ -$693 -$152
Other Changes $93 $107
 Subtotal -$201 $352
     
Debt Service $643 $808
Total Deficit Under President's Budget
$8,531 $9,761

# Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
* Measures reflect net effect of both revenue and spending changes.
~ Cost reflects net policy changes and not the transfer of pell grant funding from mandatory to discretionary outlays.

@ The CBO does not typically estimate potentail program integrity savings.
^ Large variation between CBO and OMB estimates for discretionary and war spending changes reflects different baseline estimates, which create different estimates for discretionary policy changes.

 

March 11, 2010

Ireland, like other European Union nations including Spain, Portugal, and Greece, risked losing the confidence of its creditors when it did not have a strategy to get its fiscal house in order after taking on massive debt to rescue its economy and financial system over the past few years. 

Last year, Ireland faced the same fiscal problems that Greece faces now (with the exception that Ireland was hurt by the formerly high flying housing market and “bad” banks).  Investors demanded a high risk premia and credit ratings agencies downgraded Ireland’s sovereign debt, based on rising fears that Ireland could not manage its fiscal accounts.  Investors worried that the country would have to turn to inflation to finance its debts.  Some thought in the worst case that Ireland might default on its debt and the cost of insuring against that default rose significantly.  But the Irish government acted. It developed tough budgets that included significant cuts to government spending and raising additional revenue.   

This wise action has not been without pain.  Government cuts have hurt public services and public servants and the government has faced high disapproval ratings (see Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2010).  But as the Wall Street Journal reported, there has also been an upside.   Despite still facing high deficits and debt, the cost of insuring against an Irish default has shrank and is much lower than the similar cost for Greek debt (Greece fails similar problems but has been slow to implement budgetary changes). 

The United States should follow the Irish example (and those of other countries who have undertaken fiscal turnarounds (see CRFB paper on fiscal turnaround success stories) Developing a credible plan to address a nation’s debt can assuage investors’ fears about default and fiscal policy.   The United States has the luxury and flexibility of avoiding the harsh and quick cuts that Ireland had to make and can wait until the economic recovery has firmly taken hold.  But to buy some breathing room that Ireland did not have (and that Greece may have lost), the United States must show its creditors that it is serious about stabilizing the federal debt over a reasonable timeframe. 

March 11, 2010

CRFB has yet again updated its health care comparison chart -- as well as its interactive shareable graphs -- in light of CBO's latest score of the Senate health care bill. 

We encourage you to embed the graphs on your own websites, and only ask that you link back to us.See the charts and graphs here:

 

 

 
 
 
 (note: not yet updated to reflect latest Senate estimate, which CBO projects will be $10 billion higher over ten years)
 
 
Provisions 10-Year Costs
House Bill
Senate Bill
Individual Penalties  $33  $15
Employer Payments  $135  $27
Mandate Provisions  $168  $42
     
Exchange Subsidies  ($602)  ($449)
Medicaid Expansion  ($425)  ($386)
Small Business Credits  ($25)  ($40)
Coverage Expansion  ($1052)  ($875)
     
Physician Payment Updates  n/a  n/a
Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage  n/a#  ($21)
Measures to Slow Health Care Cost Growth  ($31)  ($12)
Other Spending Changes  ($195)  ($59)
Other Spending  ($226)  ($92)
     
Prescription Drug Cost Reductions  $83#  $51
Medicare Advantage Cuts  $170  $118
Reductions in Provider Payment Updates  $173  $157
Medicare Premium Increase  n/a  $36
Medicare Payment Commission  n/a  $28
Measures to Slow Overall Health Care Cost Growth  $37  $19
Measures to Reduce Federal Health Care Spending  $106  $124
Spending Offsets  $569  $533
     
Excise Tax on High Cost Insurance  n/a  $149
Tax Gap and Loopholes Closing  $60  $17
Surtax on High Earners  $461  n/a
Limits to Health Care Tax Benefits  $22  $42
Fees on Health Care Companies  $20  $104
Medicare Payroll Tax Increase for High Earners  n/a  $87
Tax Increases  $563  $399
     
Interactions and Other Spending and Taxes
 $15  $41
Budgetary Impact Subtotal  $37  $48
CLASS Act+  $102  $70
Total Budgetary Impact  $138  $118
     
Tenth Year Surplus  $12  $11
Deficit Reduction in Second Decade  0% to 0.25% of GDP  0.25% to 0.5% of GDP
Reduction in Uninsured  36 Million  31 Million

Numbers in billions, with positive numbers representing a reduction in the deficit. Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Sources: Congressional Budget Office, Joint Committee on Taxation, and Authors' Calculations.
#Cost of expanding prescription drug coverage incorporated into savings estimate for reducing payments.
+The CLASS Act makes available government-sponsored long-term care insurance. Because this insurance would have a "vesting period," the provision appears to raise considerable amounts of revenue over the next decade. However, these revenues must ultimately be used to cover the program's costs, and therefore do not belong in the bill as an offset.

March 11, 2010

Legislation from Senators Jeff Sessions (R-AL) and Claire McCaskill (D-MO) to establish discretionary spending caps may get a third vote this week in the Senate after falling one vote short of the needed 60 votes last week. The bipartisan proposal seems to be gaining momentum after getting 56 votes in January during the debt ceiling increase debate.

The sponsors have made some slight changes in order to attract more support. The bill will institute caps for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 and allows exemptions for emergency spending with a 3/5 vote. It is now being offered as an amendment to the FAA Reauthorization bill.

CRFB supports spending caps, which in addition to PAYGO can introduce much-needed fiscal discipline in Congress. Even though discretionary spending is less of a budgetary threat than mandatory spending, it has grown faster than entitlements over the past decade. Controlling discretionary spending will be essential to reducing the federal debt.

Let’s hope the perseverance of Sessions and McCaskill pays off with one more vote for fiscal responsibility.

March 10, 2010

On Tuesday, March 9, the New York Times reported about how state and local pension funds are changing their investment strategies to improve their funds’ fiscal status. Private companies have eschewed an emphasis on stocks in their pension plan portfolios, but states have taken the opposite track and are taking bigger risks as they hope to gain enough investment return to fund future benefits. The New York Times found that:

Most {states} have been assuming their investments will pay 8 percent a year on average, over the long term. This is based on an assumption that stocks will pay 9.5 percent on average, and bonds will pay about 5.75 percent, in roughly a 60-40 mix.

So, why have states pursued a riskier investment strategy, just as private companies have begun to shift their investments?

First, a little background. State and local pension benefits, as with private pension plans, are generally either defined benefit plan or defined contribution plans (or some combination of the two). Most states have defined benefit plans which determines future retirement benefits based on a formula based on an employee’s years of service and annual pay. Generally, employees contribute some small percentage of their wages to the plan and the government also is supposed to make annual contributions. Neither type of state plan has much protection under the rules that cover private pension pensions. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended, sets the rules for private plans (defined-benefit and defined contribution). And it created the safety net for private defined benefit plans, the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) which funds retirement benefits for employees covered by private defined benefit plans that end. ERISA does not apply to either type of state and local government pension plan and the PBCG’s safety net excludes state and local government plans.

In 2007 testimony, GAO found that 58 percent of state and local governments surveyed had a funded ratio of 80 percent (80 percent of plans’ liabilities were funded through the plans’ assets, a standard that experts believe is relatively secure). The percentage was a decline from 2000 and due mainly to a decline in the stock market and its effect on the value of plans’ assets. GAO also found that governments were not contributing the full amount of their annual share to the pension plans and thus, increasing the potential future problem. And this data was collected before the Great Recession’s devastating impact on state finances. GAO found:

When a government contributes less than the full ARC, the funded ratio can decline and unfunded liabilities can rise, if all other assumptions are met about the change in assets and liabilities. Increased unfunded liabilities will require larger contributions in the future to keep pace with the liabilities that accrue each year and to make up for liabilities that accrued in the past. As a result, costs are shifted from current to future generations.

And this looming gap isn’t limited to state and local pension plans, but to other retirement benefits. In a report issued last month, the Pew Center for the States found that a trillion dollar gap existed between the “the $3.35 trillion in pension, health care and other retirement benefits states have promised their current and retired workers as of fiscal year 2008 and the $2.35 trillion they have on hand to pay for them.” Pew gave only 16 states the grade of “solid performer” when it came to funding their pension plans, but only 9 states when health benefits were factored into the grading system. (Pew also notes that this data does not reflect the financial losses of late 2008). While some states have begun to make reforms to their retirement plans (about 15 states in 2009), the demand that these liabilities will put on state budgets will decrease the amount states can spend on other priorities.

It is also a cautionary tale for Federal policymakers who are avoiding the future fiscal gap in federal pension programs, including civil service retirement, military retirement, and Social Security and the future fiscal gap of PBGC (to meet the known future demands from pension plans and firms that have already gone out of business).

March 10, 2010

A month and a half ago, Representative Paul Ryan (R-WI) released his "Roadmap for America's Future," a detailed plan to reform taxes and spending, and ultimately address our long-term debt problems in full. The CBO score of the proposal found that it would significantly improve our current debt path, and eliminate the debt in its entirety by 2080. As CRFB and others praised the plan, however, some have argued its assumptions may be unrealistic -- particularly on the tax side.

On February 4th, the Tax Policy Center's (TPC's) Howard Gleckman pointed out that CBO did not in fact truly score the revenue effects of the Roadmap. As he explained (emphasis added):

As specified by [Congressman Ryan's] staff, for this analysis total federal tax revenues are assumed to equal those under CBO’s alternative fiscal scenario (which is one interpretation of what it would mean to continue current fiscal policy) until they reach 19 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2030, and to remain at that share of GDP thereafter.

Gleckman questioned whether Ryan's plan would actually push revenues up to 19% of GDP, given that it includes a number of provisions which would tend to lower tax revenue.
 
It's true that the CBO simply assumed revenue levels, rather than estimating them. However, there does not appear to have been any trickery in obtaining these assumptions. According to Paul Ryan:
[we] asked CBO to analyze the Roadmap’s long-term revenue impact and CBO declined to do so because revenue estimates are in the jurisdiction of the Joint Tax Committee (JCT).  JCT does not currently produce revenue estimates beyond the traditional 10-year scoring horizon.  Based on consultations with the Treasury Department and other tax experts, the Roadmap’s tax rates were formulated to produce revenues equivalent to the current tax code.
Given JCT's inability to estimate Ryan's plan, though, TPC did its own analysis. According to these estimates, revenues under Ryan's roadmap would be about 2% of GDP lower annually over the next ten years than predicted by the CBO.  TPC predicted that by 2020, revenues would only be at 16.8%, compared to 18.6% in the CBO estimate.  
 
 
Rep. Ryan explained these differences by pointing out that the Roadmap's revenue baseline was made in 2009 using different economic projections than TPC (which, he points out, is not the official scorer and may come up with difference results than JCT) and that "the Tax Policy Center analysis covers a 10-year period, but the Roadmap is a long-term plan with spending and revenue projections covering 75 years."  And as he said in the previous response to TPC's criticism, "The Roadmap is a long-term plan and the natural pressures on revenues over the long-term are weighted upward, not downward" due to real bracket creep, when growth in real income pushes people into higher tax brackets, raising revenues over time even in the absence of tax changes.  
 
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), though, attempts to address this claim by extrapolating the long-term effects of the Roadmap, given TPC's short-term projections. Based on this rudimentary extrapolation, "real bracket creep" would not push revenue up to 19% of GDP until 2067 (compared to 2030 under CBO's projections). As a result, debt would peak at somewhere closer to 180 percent of GDP (around 2050) rather than 100 percent, before declining. For perspective, though, debt would hit that level 15 years earlier under CBO's Alternative Fiscal Scenario -- and rise further to 700 percent (if that were possible) by 2080.
 
 
Still, this evidence is far from damning for Ryan. As he explains (emphasis added):
The tax reforms proposed and the rates specified were designed to maintain approximately our historic levels of revenue as a share of GDP, based on consultation with the Treasury Department and tax experts.  If needed, adjustments can be easily made to the specified rates to hit the revenue targets and maximize economic growth.

Regardless of where you fall in this debate, Rep. Ryan deserves a lot of praise for putting out a detailed plan to deal with the exploding long-term debt.  Very few lawmakers have proposed specific ways to deal with our debt, and Ryan has a plan to significantly curb the cost of entitlement programs and eventually bring the debt under control.  But there is one lesson from this exercise -- large tax cuts (at least compared to current policy) are probably off the table for good, if we are serious about getting our fiscal house in order.

Though Ryan did not intend to do so, TPC and CBPP show that cutting taxes by about 2 percent of GDP (relative to current policy) would drive the debt to astronomical levels -- even assuming the extremely large (and extremely brave) spending cuts proposed by the Congressman.

Congressman Ryan is certainly right that "we simply cannot chase our unsustainable growth in spending with ever-higher levels of taxes," but there is a corollary. We don't appear to be able to chase our continued appetite for tax cuts with the necessary cuts in spending -- and we can't continue to finance them through borrowing.

To get our debt under control, both taxes and spending will have to be on the table. Representative Ryan deserves all the praise in the world by taking the first step, and putting forward a real and honest plan to move forward. If others want to criticize his plan for raising insufficient revenue or cutting spending too traumatically, that is fine. But it is time for them to put forward sustainable alternatives.

We look forward to seeing them.

March 10, 2010

The Senate has just approved, by a 62-36 vote, HR 4213, which extends unemployment compensation and COBRA benefits for the unemployed, along with many tax breaks, until the end of the year. Democratic leaders have promoted it as a jobs bill. Differences with the much-smaller House version must now be worked out.

Most of the estimated $140 billion cost of the package is not offset. The unemployment and COBRA provisions, in addition to a seven-month delay in a 21 percent reduction in Medicare physician payments were deemed “emergency” spending not subject to PAYGO. The bare minimum of 60 Senators voted to waive a PAYGO point of order raised against the bill.

The small offsets in the bill, approximately $35 billion, are a point of contention because the House and White House want to use them to partially pay for health care reform.

CRFB called for longer term offsets for the entire package to ensure it does not add to the debt. An amendment from Senators Jeff Sessions (R-AL) and Claire McCaskill (D-MO) to institute discretionary spending caps fell one vote short. Another amendment from Senator Tom Coburn (D-OK) to increase transparency of Senate spending outside of PAYGO passed unanimously 100-0.

Sustaining the recovery will require us to convince markets and our creditors that we are serious about addressing our debt. Perhaps the House can compel more aggressive offsets, like they did last week with a $17.6 billion measure providing payroll tax incentives for employers who hire unemployed workers.

March 10, 2010

This week, the New York Federal Reserve announced the beginning of a new Reverse Repurchase Agreement Program to reduce some of the liquidity in financial markets. Under the program, the Fed will sell securities from it's portfolio -- but with an obligation to repurchase them at a later date. This is an additional sign of tightening from the Fed, in light of last month's increase in the discount rate from 0.5 to 0.75 percent.

The New York Fed originally announced this program back in October in an operating policy statement, stating that they had been working internally on the operational details of repurchases and reverse repurchases to make it a viable option if the FOMC decided such a program should be used. In the statement, the Fed also announced that reverse repos are nothing new and have even "been in the Federal Reserve's toolkit for years, and the Federal Reserve has conducted them both as recently as December 2008."

The New York Fed said that the reverse repurchase agreements will initally focus on firms that provide the largest amounts of short-term funding -- namely, primary dealers and domestic money market mutual funds -- but intends to eventually broaden the pool to more participants.

Even though this can be interpreted as a method of tightening, the Fed's statement yesterday maintained that the announcement of this program should not affect expectations on any other monetary policy moves. The program will indeed reduce some liquidity in markets, but is unlikely to have any significant impact.

CRFB has incorporated this program into the list of Fed programs, created to address the economic crisis, on Stimulus.org.

March 10, 2010

From Greg Mankiw:

Imagine you have a friend who has a budget problem.  Every month he spends more than he earns.  His credit card bills are piling up.  He is clearly on an unsustainable path.  Then one day he comes to you with an idea.

Friend: I am going to take off a few days from work and fly down to Bermuda for a quick vacation.

You: But isn't that expensive?  Won't that just add to your growing debts?

Friend: Yes, it is expensive.  But my plan is deficit-neutral.  I have decided to give up that half-caf, extra-shot caramel macchiato I order at Starbucks twice every day.  I really don't need that expensive drink.  And if I give it up for the next three years, it will pay for my Bermuda trip.

You: Well, then, how are you going to solve the problem of your growing debts?

Friend: I am going to figure that out as soon as I return from Bermuda.

You: But in light of your budget problem, maybe you should give up Starbucks and skip the Bermuda vacation.  Giving up Starbucks could be the easiest way to start balancing your budget.

Friend: You really aren't any fun, are you?

This conversation is meant to illustrate why claims of deficit-neutrality in the healthcare reform bill should not give much comfort to those worried about the U.S. fiscal situation.  Even if you believe that the spending cuts and tax increases in the bill make it deficit-neutral, the legislation will still make solving the problem of the fiscal imbalance harder, because it will use up some of the easier ways to close the shortfall.  The remaining options will be less attractive, making the eventual fiscal adjustment more painful.

March 9, 2010

In a blog post yesterday, Donald Marron discussed an additional way for governments to ease budget pressures along with traditional spending cuts and tax increases. Dr. Marron noted that governments can also sell some of their assets (a proposition that is getting increasing international attention -- the focus of a Washington Post Op-Ed this morning -- in light of several German lawmakers' suggestion last week that Greece sell some of its assets).

Dr. Marron highlights that the government owns almost three trillion in assets; but while many of these -- such as government buildings and Navy ships -- are not sellable, the government owns hundreds of billions worth of financial assets.

Let's see how much the government could earn by selling some of these more notable assets...

The Financial Report of the U.S. Government shows us that the U.S. government owns $2.7 trillion in assets, up from just $2 trillion last year. These assets can be broken down into cash, international monetary assets, loans, mortgage-backed securities, and stocks. The CBO also reports the potential 10-year savings from selling portions of several agencies.

Assets

Net Value of Assets /

Ten-Year Savings1 (billions)

Sell Treasury Holdings of Fannie/Freddie MBS$221
Sell Government-Held Gold^$292
Sell Portion of Tennessee Valley Authority's Assets$161
Reduce Size of Strategic Petroleum Reserve$51
Sell the Southeastern Power Administration#$11
Sell Inventories Purchased for Resale$89
Sell Excess, Obsolete, and Unserviceable Invetory$8
Sell Excess, Obsolete, and Unserviceable Operating Materials$4
Sell Stockpile Materials Held for Sale$1
 Total$635

Sources: Financial Report of the U.S. Government, CBO Budget Options: August 2009, author's calculations.
1 Ten-year cost savings for selected sales taken from CBO Budget Options, and reflect savings between 2010 and 2019.
^ The Financial Report show the government's holdings of gold equaling $11.1 billion as of September 9, 2009. However, as Donald Marron pointed out, this number assumes that the 261,498,900 ounces of gold is valued at the statutory price of $42.2/ounce. On March 9, 2010, the value of gold was over 26 times greater at $1,118/ounce, bringing the current value of these holdings to over $292 billion.
# Includes savings of $60 million a year in related costs and projects between 2013 - 2019.

The table above shows that the U.S. could earn over $600 billion by selling some of its many assets. Asset sales would not necessarily change the "net liabilities" of government (as we discuss here), but would reduce the debt. Yet, sales of this type would be one-time fixes to our country's annual deficits and would not change the unsustainable fiscal trends we now face. 

We aren't advocating for such asset sales -- we're just trying to show how much the government could save by doing so. Marron notes that many U.S. government assets, such as stewardship and heritage sites, haven't been given dollar values, nor should they. But in the immense pile of assets the government owns - we agree with Marron that there have got to be some sellable assets in there somewhere.

See our list of previous Deficit Challenges:

 

March 9, 2010

On March 5, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) gave us a preview of its take on the President’s budget proposals for Fiscal Year 2011 (starting October 1st this year) in a letter to Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Inouye. CRFB blogged on key features of the preliminary analysis here and here. Buried in the letter is CBO's estimate that debt held by the public would rise to 90 percent of GDP by 2020 under the President’s budget. This is well above the administration’s own estimate (77 percent of GDP), and sets off alarm bells. Recent research by noted economists Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff (R&R) shows that countries grow more slowly when fiscal debt goes over the 90 percent debt-to-GDP threshold.

R&R presented their research in a paper at the latest American Economic Association annual meeting. It has generated a lot of buzz in fiscal wonk circles, as has their recent book. (“Growth in a Time of Debt,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 15639, January 2010, and This Time is Different, 2009.)

It is worrying enough to think that sometime this decade we will reach a point where our debt is sufficiently high to slow growth in a significant way. However, a closer look at R&R’s work indicates that we probably don’t have to wait until 2020 to arrive at the 90 percent threshold. In fact, we are probably just about there right now.

If you look at OMB's “gross central government debt” (the numbers used by R&R) rather than “debt held by the public” (the numbers more commonly cited by CBO and the administration), our debt/GDP ratio last year was 83 percent of GDP and is projected to be 94 percent of GDP this year. So, the United States may soon be at the point at which our debt level is linked to slower economic growth, according to R&R.

The reasons for the linkage of slower growth to the 90 percent threshold are not well-understood, but R&R and Savastano suggest a plausible explanation in another paper. Individual countries may well have a specific debt threshold above which investors demand an increase in risk premia to hold a country’s debt.  A country’s debt threshold may be based on perceptions of its historical experience [comment: or even technical issues related to its debt and financing structures]. As a country approaches its debt “limit”, interest rates will rise as risk sentiments shift. Growth will be slower as a result  (Reinhart, Rogoff, Savastano, “Debt Intolerance,” NBER Working Paper No. 9908, 2003)

For the United States, what will happen when we cross the 90 percent threshold this year?

There is tremendous uncertainty about the outlook – to say the least. While we’ve seen some signs of nervousness about our rising debt from domestic and international investors in the past year, that nervousness has not led so far to the problems that R&R highlight. The United States has so far retained its appeal as a “safe haven” (perhaps more accurately described as the international lender of last resort).

But, at some point, investor sentiment will shift, at the very least because judgment over the risk:return ratio for relative assets will change as the global economic and financial situation changes. How will investors then regard U.S. government assets relative to other assets in the United States and around the world? With our domestic savings gap likely to remain large, we will be increasingly vulnerable to a shift in investor sentiment as our public debt leverage rises.

So seeing that we are about to cross our high debt threshold now rather than in 2020 should give us pause – at a minimum. While some argue there is no magic number (see Paul Krugman's recent blog), R&R's findings suggest that once debt exceeds a certain share of the economy, there are costs in the form of lower growth. Their research offers a compelling argument about the costs of waiting to make credible, concrete plans to put our fiscal house in order once the economy is on stronger footing. 

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